How Not to Interpret a P Value?
In a recent News article, Beckman ( 1 ) discussed possible Bayesian approaches to the analysis of clinical trial data and contrasted these with the more standard frequentist approach. In debating the relative merits of different analytic approaches, it seems important to clarify the nature of the question that the scientist is asking. The scientist generally formulates a hypothesis, and the question is whether or not the hypothesis is correct. However, nothing is ever certain, and the question that the scientist really wants answered is this: What is the probability that the hypothesis is correct ? Frequentist statistics do not attach probabilities to hypotheses, and it is an error to interpret the frequentist P value as if it were the answer to the question of interest. This fundamental error is common even though there is a large literature pointing it out -the well-known prosecutor's fallacy ( 2 ) is a version of the error -and Beckman falls into the trap of making the error. She states "If the new drug has a positive effect, frequentist statistics indicate how likely it is that the effect occurred by chance, the P value ." And so the potential interpretation "A P value of 0.05 means that 5% of the time a positive result will actually be wrong." The error in interpretation was made because the definition of the P value is incorrect. The correct definition of a P value is the probability of obtaining data as extreme, or more extreme, than those observed if the null hypothesis is correct. As all good Bayesians know, the probability of observing x (the observed data) given y (the null hypothesis) is not the same as the probability of y given x (the interpretation of the P value). To answer the real question of interest based on a P value, it is also necessary to know the prior probability that the null hypothesis is correct and the statistical power to detect an effect if the alternative hypothesis is correct. These concepts are essentially the same as the concepts needed to interpret the characteristics of a diagnostic test. The test characteristics are the sensitivity (equivalent to power) and specificity (equivalent to 1 − the P value). The question that the diagnostician really wants answered is not the probability that the patient tests positive if he does not have the disease but the probability that he does not have the disease if the test is positive. To answer the latter question, it is also necessary to know the prevalence of the disease (equivalent to the prior probability).
These issues, in relation to hypothesis testing, are encapsulated in the concept of the false-positive reporting probability (FPRP) described by Wacholder et al. ( 3 ) . The FPRP is the probability that a statistically signifi cant result is a false positive. In effect, the frequentist statistic is most useful when interpreted in a Bayesian manner. This issue is not trivial. Perhaps if P values were appropriately interpreted, the problem of nonrepeatability would lessen and the frequentist versus Bayesian arguments would abate.
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